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Abstract 
This article discusses the impact of the current stagflation in Pakistan on
the labor market and poverty. The paper presents a preliminary explanation of why
the labor market and poverty impact of the current stagflation may be far smaller
than projected in recent studies, especially for the rural economy. The main
conclusions that emerge are that (1) The overwhelming expected negative impact of
low economic growth, high double-digit inflation, and crippling energy shortages
on poverty and the labor market appear to have been cushioned by the large
increase in remittances, rising wages in agriculture and services, and social safety
nets; (2) there is, however, no reason for complacency since over 20 million people
live in absolute poverty and that the economy remains in deep stagflation, (3) the
PSLM (HIES) 2010/11 data should be made publicly available so that it can be
subject to more critical analysis and (4) studies on poverty should be based on a
close integration of macro-sectoral–micro-factors to fully capture the underlying
“poverty dynamics.”  
Keywords: Macro-dynamics, economic growth, cycles, Pakistan. 
JEL classification: P46, F43. 
1. Introduction 
Over most of the last 65 years, Pakistan has grown in stop-go
cycles. The macro-dynamics underlying these cycles have been subject to
close examination.1 More recently, attention has focused on explaining a
new phenomenon—a prolonged stagnation over the last five years, 2007–
12, characterized by low economic growth and high double-digit
inflation—and on the measures attempting to overcome it, albeit with little
success so far (see Amjad, Din, & Qayyum, 2011). 
                                                     
* Vice Chancellor, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Pakistan. 
1 For an exhaustive review, see McCartney (2011). See also the Appendix for differences between
more recent stagflation and past stop-go cycles post-1980. 
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Understandably, studies analyzing the expected impact of this 
prolonged stagflation projected a sharp increase in both unemployment and 
poverty. These studies have drawn on the results of earlier studies that had 
estimated the impact of economic growth and inflation (mainly food 
inflation) on unemployment and poverty. However, little attention has been 
paid to the specific features and dynamics of the current stagflation, which 
may be significantly different from the conditions prevailing in the time 
periods covered in the earlier studies. More importantly, the estimated 
coefficients and elasticity of the relationship between poverty and economic 
growth and other variables derived in the earlier studies could significantly 
change and, hence, distort the results of more recent studies. 
It is not, therefore, surprising that, when data began to emerge on 
recent trends in unemployment and poverty, which in most cases was 
quite contrary to what recent studies had predicted, these studies were met 
with considerable disbelief and finger pointing.2  
This article wants to mark a beginning of a serious debate on the 
impact of the current stagflation on the labor market and poverty, drawing 
on not just macroeconomic developments that have been seen as major 
explanatory variables in the current debate, but combining them with a 
more in-depth understanding of the macro-sectoral–micro- (mainly labor 
market) dynamics of the current situation.3  
Such an approach is also dictated by Pakistan’s historical 
experience, where the relationship between growth and poverty has not 
been straightforward. It has witnessed periods of high growth with little 
decline in poverty, as in the 1960s. By contrast, in the 1970s low economic 
growth was accompanied by a fall in poverty. Post-1980, however, 
periods of high growth have been positively related to a decline in 
poverty as in the 1980s and 2001–07, while low economic growth in the 
1990s witnessed a rise in poverty. Interestingly, when growth declined 
significantly in 2007/08, poverty continued to decline and unemployment 
continued to fall (see Naseem, 2012). 
                                                     
2 Indeed this has been true not just for the recent debate on poverty trends, but going back to 
changes in poverty levels since the 1960s. For an excellent review of past studies and debates, see 
Naseem (2012). 
3 See Bourguignon, Bussolo, and da Silva (2008) who present macro-micro evaluation techniques 
and tools to analyze the impact of macroeconomic policies on poverty and income distribution. As 
their introduction states, “In fact, the application of variants of a single modeling framework—a 
macro model linked with household level micro—is the unifying methodological theme of this 
volume.” Although the current study does not carry out any modeling exercise, this is clearly a field 
open for further study. 
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The remaining article is divided into five main sections. Section 2 
presents a brief review of studies projecting the impact of the current 
stagflation on unemployment and poverty. Section 3 then presents the 
evidence based on recent data on movements of key labor market and 
poverty-related variables. Section 4 presents the results of previous studies 
that have estimated the impact of key economic variables on poverty and 
on which recent studies have mainly relied. Section 5 attempts a 
preliminary explanation of why the labor market and poverty impact of the 
current stagflation could have been far smaller than projected in recent 
studies, especially for the rural economy. Here, we explore the macro-
sectoral–micro dynamics of the current stagflation. The concluding section 
summarizes our main findings and makes some suggestions on how best 
to carry forward this debate. 
2. A Review of Selected Studies on the Impact of the Economic 
Slowdown and Inflation on Unemployment and Poverty  
(“He who has not sinned throw the first stone”!) 
The results of four important studies on Pakistan are discussed here, 
together with the results of a World Bank (2012) update on global estimates 
of poverty. As we shall see, all four studies projected a sharp increase in 
poverty post-2008. The World Bank study, in contrast, presented preliminary 
global updated estimates for 2010, which indicated that poverty in 
developing countries based on a smaller sample (which probably did not 
include Pakistan) continued to fall, as it had done over 2005–08.  
2.1. The Panel of Economists: Interim Report on Economic Stabilization 
with a Human Face4 
The Panel of Economists set up by the Planning Commission in 
September 2008 consisted of eminent economists who were to recommend 
measures to overcome the economic crisis resulting from unsustainable 
current account and fiscal deficit. These deficits had reached 8 and 9 
percent of GDP, respectively, as a result of the unprecedented increase in 
oil and food prices accentuated by a policy of “inaction and neglect” 
adopted by the last government. The Panel’s recommended stabilization 
measures to restore macro-stability and avoid default were accepted by the 
government, which saw them as an endorsement of the standby-
                                                     
4 The author was a member/convener of this panel and shared the views expressed in its report. 
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arrangement it had negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to stabilize the economy (see Pakistan, Planning Commission, 2008). The 
Panel, as indeed did the IMF, strongly advocated adopting cost-effective 
social safety nets to help cushion the negative impact of stabilization on the 
poor and the vulnerable—hence, stabilization with a “human face.” 
The Panel had undertaken a simulation exercise to determine the 
impact of stabilization measures on key economic variables, based on an 
abridged version of the integrated social policy and macroeconomic model 
(SPMM) developed by the Social Policy and Development Centre and the 
Planning Commission’s consistency model–macroeconomic framework. 
The main results in relation to unemployment and poverty were as follows. 
1. The unemployment level would increase further in 2008/09, due to 
the deepening of the economic downturn, and the unemployment 
rate would increase cumulatively by 3 percentage points over 2008/09 
and 2009/10, reaching a level of well over 8 percent. These estimates 
were based on an employment elasticity of 0.45, based on past trends 
applied to projected economic growth over these years. 
2. The proportion of those below the poverty line would increase by 3.5 
percentage points in 2007/08 (mainly due to the explosion in food 
prices), 2.7 percentage points in 2008/09, and 2.0 percentage points in 
2009/10. 
3. Based on informed judgment, as the Panel’s report put it, combining 
the inflation and unemployment effects would add 6 percentage 
points to poverty incidence in 2004/05, raising the poverty level to 35 
percent in 2008/09 if the level in 2004/05 was taken as 29 percent (or 
to 31 percent if the 2004/05 level was taken as 25 percent). This 
would, it claimed, translate into an additional 15 million people 
falling below the poverty line by 2008/09. 
It must be said that the Panel was aware of the shortcomings of the 
exercise carried out—mainly the lack of more recent data, which precluded 
a more systematic and rigorous exercise being undertaken. But, clearly, the 
message was that both unemployment and poverty would increase as a 
result of stabilization, the global financial crisis and the resulting global 
recession accentuated by a sharp increase in prices as subsidies were cut 
back to restore the macro-balance. 
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2.2. Institute of Public Policy: Annual Reports on the State of the Economy  
The Institute of Public Policy (IPP)’s first annual report, State of the 
Economy (2008) was released just before the budget in June 2008 (as was to 
be done in subsequent years), soon after the newly elected government had 
taken office earlier in March. The report claimed that poverty had risen 
substantially to 33.8 percent in 2007/08 due to food inflation and the 
slowdown in economic growth, with the level increasing from 29.2 percent 
in 2004/05 (taken as the base year using the World Bank’s re-estimated 
poverty estimates compared to the 25.2 percent claimed by the 
government, using the same dataset for 2004/05.) 
The IPP report projected a continuing rise in poverty (see Table 1) if 
the increase in food prices and low growth was to persist, rising to as high 
as 43 percent of the population or 80 million people falling below the 
poverty line by 2011/12.  
Table 1: IPP estimates of poverty incidence, 1999–2012 
Year 
Headcount ratio Impact of food inflation 
World Bank 
estimates (%) 
Headcount ratio 
(%) 
Number of poor 
(millions) 
1998/99 30.0 30.00 40.35 
2001/02 34.4 34.40 50.21 
2004/05 29.2 29.20 45.48 
2005/06  28.68 45.74 
2006/07  29.47 48.12 
2007/08  33.81 56.55 
2008/09  36.11 61.84 
2009/10  38.41 67.35 
2010/11  40.70 73.10 
2011/12  43.01 79.08 
Source: IPP. (2008). State of the economy, Table 4.7.  
The report does not clearly spell out the detailed methodology 
adopted to project poverty for the period 2005/06 to 2011/12, but states 
that it was based on the coefficients of the elasticity of poverty with respect 
to food inflation, adjusted for growth in per capita income, estimated by 
Akhtar and Ahmed (1999). These coefficients must then have been applied 
to the projected growth and inflation figures used in the report. 
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The IPP’s subsequent three annual reports continued to claim a rising 
and high level of poverty, but it would appear that no new exercise was 
undertaken, and that these were drawn from the 2008 report as economic 
conditions had not changed and high inflation and low growth persisted. In 
its latest annual report (2012), the IPP turns its attention from poverty to 
worsening income distribution, based on a comparison of the latest 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) for 2010/11 and 2007/08 data 
(as reported in the Pakistan Economic Survey for 2011). However, the reports 
presents no new estimates of poverty, presumably because the raw HIES 
2010/11 data had not been released. The report expresses its concern about 
the conditions of the lower-income group as follows:  
Even though we believe that the HIES surveys understate 
income inequality, it is noteworthy that they report that 
inequality has continued to increase during the last three 
years. Overall, the lowest two quintiles of household 
have suffered a drop in their real incomes, while 
significant increases have been recorded in the case of 
upper-income households. This also implies that the 
incidence of poverty have increased during the last three years 
(italics added) (IPP, 2012, p. 32).  
2.3. Asian Development Bank: Food Poverty and Inflation in Developing 
Asia: Is Poverty Reduction Coming to an End? (2008) 
As food inflation rose in response to the steep rise in oil and 
commodity prices in 2007/08, international agencies including the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank, and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) all warned of an impending crisis due to large 
expected increases in poverty and malnutrition, given that the poor 
spend a large proportion of their income on food grains. Many of these 
agencies also released data on the numbers that would fall into poverty 
and suffer malnutrition. 
Somewhat dramatically, the ADB (2008) questioned whether the 
poverty reduction achieved in the recent past was coming to an end with 
rising food inflation. Comparing the impact of the rise in food prices on 
poverty in the Philippines and Pakistan, the ADB showed that the impact 
on the latter was much larger (almost three times) due to its lower per 
capita income, thus illustrating the vulnerability of the low-income 
developing countries. Applying these estimates to Pakistan, where food 
inflation increased by almost 80 percent in the four years post-2007/08, 
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would imply that the number of people in poverty more than doubled by 
2010/11—a figure near that estimated by the IPP.5 
Table 2: Changes in number of poor (millions) with increase in food 
prices 
Country 10% 20% 30% 
Philippines 2.72 5.65 8.87 
Pakistan 7.05 14.67 21.96 
Note: To estimate the number of additional poor, national poverty lines were used. These 
estimates are concerned only with the price effect on consumers, i.e., they do not take into 
account the impact of prices changes on producers.  
Source: ADB. (2008). Food prices and inflation in developing Asia: Is poverty reduction coming to 
an end?  
2.4. ADB: Global Food Price Inflation and Developing Asia (2011) 
With the re-emergence of a spike in global food prices in 2011, 
which had increased by more than 30 percent year on year, the ADB (2011) 
undertook a fresh exercise to estimate its impact on poverty. The results for 
Pakistan projected a 2.2 percentage point increase in the percentage of the 
poor for a 10 percent increase in food prices, and an increase of 3.47 million 
people in the number of the poor. It is interesting to note that these 
estimates are almost half of the earlier estimates, and bring out the 
sensitivity of such analysis to the methodology used.6 
While the government still did not officially acknowledge the 
poverty estimates for 2007/08, it is interesting that the Pakistan Economic 
Survey for 2010/11 cites the ADB (2011) study in detail. The latter’s 
numbers are used to state that, if they were true, poverty would increase 
by almost 50 percent, given a food inflation rate of around 70 percent in the 
preceding three years. Clearly, the government was taking international 
agencies’ estimates seriously.  
2.5. World Bank: Global Poverty Update (2012) 
Like the ADB, the World Bank had also drawn attention through 
press and other statements to the vulnerability of developing countries to 
                                                     
5 With an 80 percent increase in food inflation between 2007 and 2012, the ADB’s estimates would 
imply an increase of 56 million people in poverty.  
6 These estimates were derived using the price elasticity of poverty, which was estimated for both 
the headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio (see ADB, 2011). 
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the spike in food prices, emphasizing that extreme poverty levels would, in 
consequence, substantially increase post-2008. It therefore came as a 
surprise to many when the World Bank announced that its preliminary 
estimates for 2010 indicated that poverty had continued to fall despite the 
global economic crisis and other shocks, and that the first Millennium 
Development Goal had been met. As for the earlier ones for 2005–08, these 
estimates were based on a poverty line of USD 1.25 a day, but were drawn 
from a smaller sample of developing countries than for the 2005–08 
estimates (World Bank, 2012). 
It may be important to note here that these were perhaps the first 
estimates by an international agency to suggest that poverty levels had not 
been impacted to the extent that many of them had predicted as a result of 
the global economic crisis and food inflation. However, these results 
caught little global attention and indeed have not been cited in the recent 
poverty debate in Pakistan.  
3. The Impact of Stagflation on the Labor Market and Poverty: What 
Actually Happened (or What the Data Suggests Happened) 
3.1. Labor Market Developments 
Let us start by examining what happened in the labor market. The 
Panel of Economists had projected a sharp increase in unemployment, and 
though the exact increase projected varies somewhat in different sections of 
the report, the broad conclusion was that it would increase from around 6 
percent in 2006/07 to well over 8 percent by 2009/10, adding almost 2 
million to the unemployed (see Pakistan, Planning Commission, 2008). 
The more recent data based on the Pakistan government’s Labour 
Force Surveys shows that, while unemployment did go up, the increase 
was far smaller than what the Panel had projected. As Figure 1 shows, 
unemployment increased from around 5 percent in 2007/08 to 6 percent in 
2010/11, not to well over 8 percent as the Panel’s projections had implied. 
Interestingly, unemployment continued to decline between 2006/07 and 
2007/08, while the Panel (and other analysts) had expected an increase due 
to the slowdown in economic growth. (Indeed, other studies—including 
that by the World Bank—have used this decline to justify the decrease 
shown in the 2007/08 poverty estimates.)  
This study further explores the impact of the economic slowdown 
on the labor market by examining the behavior of real wages during this 
period. According to our estimates, the real wages of agricultural workers 
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showed a substantial increase between 2007/08 and 2009/10. These 
estimates are based on wage data given in the annual reports of the 
Agriculture Policy Institute (API). The findings are supported by 
preliminary studies at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics 
(PIDE), which, based on Labour Force Survey data, also show an increase 
in real wages in agriculture during these years, though the suggested 
increase is smaller than that implied by the API data.7 
Figure 1: GDP growth, unemployment rate, and real wages of 
agricultural and construction workers 
 
Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey (2001–2011); Labour Force Survey (2001–2011); 
Agriculture Policy Institute (2001–2011), Support price policy for wheat: Annual report. 
For urban areas, the daily real wages of construction workers show 
a decline of around 15 percent between 2007/08 and 2009/10 in contrast to 
rural agricultural workers. In the services sector, which reflects more urban 
than rural, PIDE’s preliminary estimates (based on Labour Force Survey 
data) show an increase. 
In examining these labor markets developments, it is important to 
bear in mind that unemployment rates may not fully capture the state of 
the labor market—in the absence of any effective or comprehensive social 
safety nets, most people in developing countries have to work for a living. 
                                                     
7 I am grateful to Dr M. Irfan for carrying out this exercise based on the Labor Force Survey data 
available at PIDE.  
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Therefore, in the context of developing countries, it is important to 
interpret unemployment as an indicator of the labor market along with 
other variables—such as what is happening to real wages—to better gauge 
the extent to which the labor market might have slackened or tightened. A 
similar problem arises with elasticity-of-employment estimates—being the 
reverse of labor productivity, they may show an increase as people move 
from higher-productivity to lower-productivity jobs, and fail to capture the 
slackening in the labor market. 
3.2. Recent Estimates of Poverty 
It is in predicting what would happen to poverty in the face of a 
prolonged stagflation that—at least on the basis of the latest Pakistan Social 
and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM/HIES) 2010/11 
poverty estimates—the studies reviewed, and indeed many analysts, 
appear to have really got it wrong. 
The Arif Commission, set up by the Planning Commission to 
calculate the level of poverty, use the same 2,350 caloric poverty line as for 
earlier years to estimate a further decline in poverty from 17.2 percent in 
2007/08 to 12.4 percent in 2010/11, based on the PSLM (HIES) data for the 
latter year.8 Its results also suggest that poverty has declined in both urban 
and rural areas, with the former falling to just over 7 percent and the latter 
at around 16 percent. 
The second important set of poverty estimates to have recently 
emerged are from PIDE’s Pakistan Panel Household Survey (PPHS) 
conducted in 2010. These results are not strictly comparable with the PSLM 
(HIES) data as the PPHS panel is slightly biased toward poorer districts in 
Pakistan. Moreover, the PPHS only covers rural poverty till 2004 and only 
the Punjab and Sindh provinces in that year. Nonetheless, the results are 
revealing. Based on the same poverty line of 2,350 calories, the data shows 
that, while rural poverty did increase in Punjab and Sindh between 2004 and 
2010, it did so marginally—from around 24 to 27 percent. Rural poverty for 
2010 for all provinces is estimated at 22.4 percent (Arif & Farooq, 2012). 
These findings on poverty based on the two most recent surveys 
conducted in 2010 and 2010/11 clearly indicate that there was, at best, a 
slight increase in poverty; indeed, there could have even been a 
                                                     
8 See Khan (2012, May 8). These results have been frequently cited in the press and are now 
generally accepted as reflecting the results derived by the Arif Commission.  
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significant decline. These results are quite contrary to what the four 
studies we have analyzed had projected. The only exception to these 
results is the World Bank global estimates for developing countries, 
which had projected a continuation of the declining trend in poverty 
witnessed during 2005–08 to 2010. However, the World Bank’s figures 
did not, in all probability, cover Pakistan. 
4. Factors Impacting Poverty in Pakistan: Results of Selected Past Studies 
In examining these recent results on poverty and coming up with a 
possible explanation for how this could have happened, let us briefly 
review the results of three important studies that identify explanatory 
variables and their coefficients in determining poverty movements in 
Pakistan. (For a more detailed review, see Naseem, 2012.)  
Amjad and Kemal (1997) cover the period between 1963/64 and 
1992/93, and identify real per capita income (–1.01), remittances per capita 
(–0.23), and real wages (–0.22) as significant variables. Interestingly, they 
do not find inflation to be significant.9 Akhtar and Ahmed (1999) extend 
Amjad and Kemal’s study, mainly by increasing the number of 
observations for poverty by extrapolating poverty figures for years not 
available. The important variables they identify are real per capita income 
(–1.87), remittances per capita (–0.09), increases in food prices (0.52), the 
human capital index (–0.80), and decline in unemployment (–0.11).  
A key variable that is not incorporated by the studies analyzed in 
Section 2 is remittances, which, we have seen, is identified as a significant 
variable in explaining the poverty decline in Pakistan (Akhtar & Ahmed, 
1999; Amjad & Kemal, 1997). Remittances have increased by just over USD 
1 billion in 2000/01 to nearly USD 13 billion in 2011/12 (Pakistan, Ministry 
of Finance, 2012). A recent study by Amjad, Arif, and Irfan (2012) identifies 
a rise in the number of Pakistanis abroad and higher-skilled migrants as 
important factors for this increase (besides the tightening of laws to reduce 
money laundering, i.e., sending remittances through unofficial or “hawala” 
channels). The study also suggests that these remittances are from not just 
Pakistani workers abroad but from the entire Pakistani diaspora, which is 
estimated at around 8 million. 
In the context of the impact of remittances on poverty, Amjad’s 
(2010) study for the recent period is important because it shows that this 
                                                     
9 Figures in parentheses are elasticities. 
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impact depends critically on two factors. The first is whether remittances 
are sent through official or unofficial channels, with the former having a far 
greater impact on the economy and, through it, on poverty, compared to 
far smaller impact of unofficial flows, which represent transfer payments 
within Pakistan rather than actual inflows into the country. The second 
factor concerns the sender of the remittances, with the impact on poverty 
being much greater if remittances are sent by semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers to their families back home compared to those sent by 
professionals or middle- to high-income earners or by those permanently 
settled abroad. Siddiqui (2011) also shows that, in Pakistan’s case, the share 
of remittances from the Middle East has had the highest negative impact 
on poverty while remittances from industrialized developed countries 
appear to have had little or no impact on poverty. 
More recently, Arif and Farooq (2012) have analyzed the results of 
the three rounds of the PIDE/PPHS in rural areas conducted in 2001, 
2004, and 2010. They also offer some very important insights into poverty 
dynamics in Pakistan. According to their analysis, only 9 percent of 
Pakistan’s rural population lives in chronic poverty, while almost 50 
percent move in and out of poverty, showing their extreme vulnerability 
to economic shocks such as a rise in food prices, illness, and natural 
disasters such as floods or earthquakes. Arif and Farooq also identify 
land ownership, number of livestock, education levels, and family size as 
important explanatory variables determining those who live in poverty 
and those who do not. Their preliminary study has not yet explored 
factors such as remittances (though data is available) and their impact 
will be discussed in later reports.  
Two important conclusions emerge from this brief review. The first 
is that, besides economic growth and food inflation, there are other 
important variables—especially remittances and changes in the labor 
market (the unemployment rate, real wages)—that impact poverty. The 
second is that measuring this impact in terms of elasticity coefficients, i.e., 
the elasticity of poverty with respect to these variables, is sensitive to both 
the time periods covered as well as the methodology used. 
5. Toward Explaining the Impact of Stagflation on Poverty and the 
Labor Market 
In the face of both national and regional studies that strongly 
advocated that the slowdown in economic growth and high food inflation 
would lead to a very large increase in poverty (as discussed in Section 2), 
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can there be any plausible defense of the contrary results emerging from 
the recent surveys put forward in Section 4? 
A simple option would be to say that the data is unreliable or, 
worse, doctored, and put an end to the debate. 
Alternatively, can one probe deeper into the dynamics of the current 
stagflation and explore how the macro-developments worked themselves 
through the economy and impacted people’s lives? Were some sectors of 
the economy—especially those in which the poor are concentrated—
shielded from the economic slowdown? Was the rural economy doing 
better than the urban economy? Was the informal economy still managing 
to grow while the formal economy bore the brunt of the economic 
slowdown? Did remittances protect the poor from high inflation? Were the 
government’s social protection initiatives, e.g., the Benazir Income Support 
Programme (BISP), and the large increases in public expenditure on social 
protection able to provide an effective safety net that protected people from 
falling into poverty? Is Pakistan a “two-speed economy”? 
These are important questions that analysts have raised in the 
context of the continuing stagflation and the so-called “resilience” of the 
Pakistan economy in the face of a host of adversities. Clearly, it is not 
possible to do justice to all these issues in this article. Nonetheless, even a 
somewhat partial and preliminary analysis can help find important clues 
that might well provide some justification for the recent results on poverty. 
Let us first, however, put the data issue to rest. 
5.1. The Poverty Data 
An important premise of this paper is that very little is gained by 
taking the view that the data is not accurate. Most data in developing 
countries, whether on poverty or national income, is not, being at best 
robust and reflecting broad changes rather than very accurately capturing 
them. To suggest that the data has been tampered with is also not very 
helpful, for again there is no reason to believe that one government is less 
or more honest than the other. In any case, the data results of the PSLM 
(HIES) 2010/11 were derived by a team headed by an independent expert 
on poverty. If economists were to discard data on the basis of these two 
explanations, they would not have any time-series data or, for that matter, 
any data with which to work.  
Rashid Amjad 64 
This view does not preclude the possibility that the methodology 
used to work out a consistent poverty line could be subject to debate and, 
indeed, controversy, as has happened in the past. This issue is important, 
given the extreme sensitivity of poverty estimates to the poverty line and 
that a large number of households are clustered just below or above the 
poverty line.  
5.1.1. The Rural vs. Urban Economy 
The agriculture sector grew at only around 2.5 percent on average 
over 2007–12, with wide fluctuations resulting from weather conditions and 
floods. This would mean that there was little growth in productivity. 
However, the rural economy received a strong stimulus when the new 
democratic government doubled the procurement price of wheat from PKR 
450/40 kg to PKR 950/40 kg during the course of 2008/09. Wheat is the 
major crop grown during the winter months (the “rabi” season), and though 
fertilizer and energy prices also increased, farmers’ profits received a major 
boost. The support price of rice was also increased to reflect rising world 
prices. The prices of other crops also rose. On the whole, these increases led 
to a major shift in the domestic terms of trade in favor of agriculture. 
This, together with the healthy growth of the livestock sector, 
which now contributes just over 50 percent of value-added to agriculture, 
led to a spurt in consumer spending. This was reflected in high growth in 
rural demand for goods such as food and beverages and for consumer 
durables, including motor vehicles and motorcycles.10 
Was this boom restricted to large and medium-size farmers and food 
merchants, while small farmers and landless labor—who account for 30 
percent of the rural labor force and who are net buyers of food grains—lose 
out? The data on agricultural workers’ real wages does not support this 
viewpoint as these increased substantially (see Section 4). This makes sense 
for, clearly, farm laborers were aware of the price hike and, even if no longer 
paid mostly in kind, appear to have been able to bargain for a higher wage. 
                                                     
10 To quote from the Pakistan Economic Survey for 2010/11 (Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, 2011, p. 
36) describing economic changes during that year: “Initial spurt in large scale manufacturing was 
supported by enormous raise in and allowances of public sector employees, and huge transfer of 
resources to rural areas owing to higher prices of agriculture. Moreover, significant rise in worker’s 
remittances as well as public/private transfers to the flood affected areas has strongly impacted on the 
consumer demand for consumer durables [sic].”  
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In contrast, the urban economy was, clearly, badly hit by the global 
recession and energy shortages. This was especially true of manufacturing, 
where not just large- and medium-scale industry but also the small-scale 
sector, which could not afford captive power, was badly affected. The 
services sector, however, appears to have shown signs of healthy growth, 
and here remittances may well have played an important part. Real wages 
in services, which is more urban than rural, increased during this period. A 
substantial increase in the wages of public sector employees—raised by 50 
percent in July 2010—and increases of about half this amount in other 
years, would have provided protection against inflation. 
The large cuts in public sector expenditures as part of the 
stabilization program adversely affected the construction sector. This, 
together with a slump in private sector housing, is reflected in the decline 
construction workers’ wages. 
5.1.2. The Formal vs. Informal Economy  
The State Bank of Pakistan’s (2012)11 view is that, while the formal 
sector was badly hit as a result of the global recession and power outages, 
the informal economy—which contributes about one third in value-added 
to the overall urban economy but employs nearly 70 percent of the urban 
labor force—remained resilient, growing apparently by its “bootstraps.” 
This view ignores the linkages between the formal and informal 
economies; if the former had been badly hit, it is difficult to see the 
informal economy growing simply on its own. Again, remittances could 
counter this argument.  
To sum up, it would appear that there were sectors that managed to 
grow despite the overall slowdown in economic growth. There were two 
major factors responsible for this. The first was the stimulus to the rural 
economy, spurred by a large increase in the prices of major food crops and 
steady growth in the nonfarm sector, which led to a growth in demand for 
selected manufactures and the growth of the services sector. The second 
factor was the massive increase in remittances, which doubled during these 
five years to over USD 13 billion in 2011/12, and raised consumption 
demand as little of it flowed into investment due to economic uncertainty 
and the deteriorating law-and-order situation. This view is supported by 
the fact that consumption levels increased throughout this period, while 
                                                     
11 To quote, “There is a growing sense that Pakistan’s undocumented economy (the informal 
economy) is vibrant. In effect there seems to be a disconnect” (State Bank of Pakistan, 2012, p. 5). 
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investment bore the brunt of low growth, falling from nearly 20 percent of 
GDP to around 11 percent during 2007–12 (see Amjad et al., 2011). 
5.2. Movement of Key Variables Impacting Poverty, 2007–12 
A more rigorous, econometric analysis attempting to explain the 
decline in poverty during the last five years could establish whether the 
factors that impact increasing poverty outweighed those that lead to a 
decline in poverty.  
While we have not undertaken such an analysis, we examine the 
movement of key variables that may have been important in impacting 
poverty, and then draw a more tentative conclusion, i.e., what this suggests 
in terms of an increase or fall in poverty levels during this period.  
 Per capita income growth was low in this period, on average, around 
2.5 percent, but still slightly higher than the growth in population at 
2.1 percent per annum. Its overall impact could, therefore, be taken at 
best as neutral. 
 Food inflation increased by nearly 80 percent over these five years, 
and is thus rightly identified as the most important factor that would 
have led to a significant increase in poverty. As per the ADB’s (2008) 
projections, this could have doubled poverty to nearer 35 or 40 
percent of the population, as indeed the IPP’s projections also suggest. 
 Real wages increased for agricultural workers but declined for the 
construction sector; wages overall increased in the services sector. 
Given that poverty is higher in rural areas and that the landless are 
the most vulnerable overall, these movements could have led to a 
decline in poverty. 
 Remittances per capita showed a continuing phenomenal increase 
between 2007 and 2012, doubling in volume to just over USD 13 billion 
in 2011/12. This massive increase would have had a strong impact on 
reducing poverty. The impact would have been greater during this 
period as Amjad et al. (in press) show that there has been (i) a 
significant shift in remittances toward rural areas, (ii) a large increase in 
the number of Pakistani workers going abroad, and (iii) an increase in 
remittances coming through formal rather than informal channels. 
 The human capital index, though still low, has improved slightly in 
recent years, especially in relation to the youth population (15–24 
years), implying that it had a marginal impact on reducing poverty. 
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 Unemployment increased by around one percentage point and would 
have led to a rise in poverty, but this impact may have been negated 
to some extent by rising real wages. 
 There has been a very significant increase in both federal and provincial 
expenditures on measures to protect the poor through safety nets/social 
protection. At the federal level these increased from around PKR 10 
billion in 2007/08 to PKR 80 billion in subsequent years. The major 
increase was direct income support to the female household head under 
the BISP, which was to cover 5 million households. Even accounting for 
shortfalls in coverage in earlier years and flaws in targeting the really 
poor and vulnerable, these expenditures would have significantly helped 
cushion the impact of the increase in food inflation on the poor.  
If one were now to apply the elasticities of each of these variables 
with respect to poverty as estimated in earlier studies and other 
developments specific to this period, there is reason to believe that the 
negative factors were outweighed by the positive factors and that poverty 
could well have declined. In any case, this analysis clearly establishes that 
even if there was an increase, it was certainly not as high as earlier studies 
have claimed.  
In drawing these still tentative conclusions, one needs to keep in 
mind that Pakistan is not an exception in being able to cushion the impact 
on poverty of the unprecedented increase in oil and commodity prices and 
ensuing global recession. The World Bank’s global estimates of poverty 
cited earlier also point in the same direction, though clearly Pakistan’s 
economy has fared much worse than most developing economies, 
especially compared to its South Asian neighbors. 
The analysis clearly shows, however, that the methodology applied 
by the earlier studies was seriously flawed. To merely relate food inflation 
to poverty was to ignore the many other important developments taking 
place in the economy, which both cushion and mitigate its impact. There is 
an inherent dynamic in all economies where different actors, including the 
state, adjust in different ways to a price or other shock to the economy. 
Analyzing this macro-sectoral–micro-interaction provides a far better 
understanding of what is happening to poverty in Pakistan than just 
identifying one variable, however important it may be, and coming up 
with sensational results.  
6. Conclusions 
The main conclusions that emerge from this study are given below. 
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 The overwhelming expected negative impact of low economic 
growth, high double-digit inflation, and crippling energy shortages 
on poverty and the labor market appear to have been cushioned by 
the large increase in remittances, rising wages in agriculture and 
services, and social safety nets. 
 There is, however, no reason for complacency and it should be kept in 
mind that, even today, over 20 million people live in absolute poverty—
less than PKR 1,750 per person per month or just over PKR 55 per day in 
2010/11 prices—and that the economy remains in deep stagflation. 
 The PSLM (HIES) 2010/11 data should be made publicly available so 
that it can be subject to more critical analysis. 
 Perhaps this article’s most important message is that studies on poverty 
should be based on a close integration of macro-sectoral–micro-factors 
to fully capture the underlying “poverty dynamics” and begin with an 
“open mind” rather than the pre-conceived, fixed positions that appear 
to mark much of the public debate on poverty in recent months. 
Even if these conclusions on poverty are indeed true, it is important 
to point out that the Pakistan economy has been very poorly managed in 
recent years, and it would be a big mistake to take solace in the fact that 
poverty did not increase in this period. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Pakistan’s macroeconomic performance, 1980/81 to 2011/12 
 
Source: Amjad, Din, and Qayyum (2011) (updated for 2011/12) and Pakistan Economic 
Survey. 
 
